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media mythology of the Pentagon Papers case. Rudenstine's useful book may not
satisfy all readers looking for the first, but it will also have something to offer
those interested in the second.
JOHN NERONE
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, The Selling of Supreme Court Nominees.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. xii, 193 pp. $26.95.
John Anthony Maltese has written a genial book on a subject of enormous
importance and enduring interest-presidential selection and senatorial considera-
tion of Supreme Court nominees. Readers new to this field will find The Selling of
Supreme Court Nominees a helpful introduction to it. Those more familiar with it
will not find much that is surprising.
There seems little doubt that the process of selection and consideration of
Supreme Court nominees has become more contentious over the last thirty years
than it generally was in the sixty years before. That is not to say that a President
inevitably faces difficulty in securing approval of his choices: Bill Clinton has
managed to fill two vacancies with less flutter than might be expected, by choos-
ing well qualified candidates whose judicial views were closer to the ideological
center than were those of many nominees. Maltese thinks this is the way to go:
The confirmation process is inherently political, he says, and Presidents should
not only "search for quality" but also set "an example of moderation" (p. 158).
I am less sure than he about the virtues of moderation. A Court full of
extremists would not be a good thing, but I believe there is value in having some
extremists on the Court; Louis Brandeis and Hugo Black, as well as Antonin
Scalia and Robert Bork, qualify as extremists. In part for this reason, I believe, as
I have argued elsewhere, that the renewed politicization of the confirmation
process is unfortunate. But, for the foreseeable future, my side has lost that battle:
After the Bork battle, there is no reason for any senator to pay any substantial
degree of ideological deference to the choice made by the president.
The interesting historical question is why the process changed in the way it
has. It is helpful here to start the story before Maltese does. In the four decades
surrounding the Civil War, Supreme Court nominations were even more vulnera-
ble than they are today. By the time of Taft's presidency, they were virtually
always successful-though Wilson's nomination of Brandeis in 1916 showed how
controversial a provocative nomination could still be. The easing of sectional ten-
sions accounts for only part of the change. The growth of the Court as a national
institution, rather than one consisting of representatives from each of the judicial
circuits, also played a role. But most important, perhaps, was the almost deific sta-
tus of judges in the early years of the century, a status suggested by the recurrent
nomination during this era of sitting or former high court judges-Parker, Taft,
and Hughes-for the Presidency. It appeared unseemly in such an environment for
mere senators to make a political issue of nominations for the Supreme Court. I
suspect that the steady erosion of this attitude of judicial exaltation has more than
anything else to do with the renewed politicization of the confirmation process.
Maltese puts great emphasis on two other factors-the popular election of
Senators after ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, and the growth
of interest group power. But he offers no strong evidence concerning the impact of
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popular election, and the frequent rejections of nominees during the earlier period
indicates that this factor may have limited explanatory force. The nomination of
Mahlon Pitney in 1912, opposed by 26 Senators because of the perception (based
on thin evidence but probably accurate) that he was anti-labor provides some sug-
gestion that popular election was not necessary to give interest groups significant
power in this context.
The best parts of Maltese's books are those describing how executive branch
efforts in behalf of Supreme Court nominees have become more intense in recent
decades; his use of papers from the Nixon Administration offers some interesting
vignettes. It would have been most useful, however, if he had been able to assess
the impact that interest groups have had in the selection of nominees for the Court.
It is the choice of a nominees from among many possible candidates, rather than
the binary process of confirmation or rejection that offers the greatest potential to
determine the actual identity of the new justice-and it is also the selection
process that is most hidden from public view. Maltese emphasizes the importance
of the selection process, but he does relatively little to illuminate it. Of course, that
process, so variable from one President to another, so hidden from public view, is
a particularly difficult subject to study.
Apart from a couple of glaring bloopers in one paragraph on page 47 (William
Howard Taft was never vice president, and Justice Peckham's given name was
Rufus; cousin Wheeler was nominated by Cleveland but rejected in 1894), Maltese
seems to have his facts straight. His writing style is rather discursive, which would
be more of a problem were the book not so short and entertaining.
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN
University of Michigan Law School
PHILLIP J. COOPER, Battles on the Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court.
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995. xi, 224 pp. $24.95.
The purpose of this book is to examine the history of conflict among the jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court. The justices, of course, have always pre-
ferred to portray life in the marble temple as a scholarly, high-minded, and colle-
gial effort to interpret the law in a principled and nonpartisan manner. This is one
of the enduring legacies of John Marshall, who sought to promote collegiality and
consensus by arranging for all of the justices to dine together after each day's oral
arguments and to live in the same boarding house whenever the Court was in ses-
sion. Phillip Cooper, however, points out that over a long period of time, such
forced attempts to suppress conflict in the interest of harmony will inevitably lead
to "intense grudges that sooner or later [will] surface in bitter words and behavior
among the justices" (p. 6).
Conflict has long been a major theme in research on the Supreme Court, par-
ticularly in judicial biographies and in historical studies of major cases and contro-
versies. It is noteworthy, therefore, that Battles on the Bench is the first book to
analyze conflict among the justices in a thorough and well-organized manner. The
book addresses four important questions: "Why do the justices fight? How do they
fight? What difference does it make? Why do they not fight more often?" (p. 3).
Cooper's answers to these questions are primarily based upon published judicial
biographies, the justices' papers, and interviews given by some of the justices.
The emphasis on judicial biography is intentional. Cooper laments that so few
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